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Introduction
Explanation for Ireland’s impressive economic performance in the 1990s, continuing
though at a lower level into the 2000s, has often been presented as if it were mainly a
matter of sorting out the technical economic issues. The outcomes of rebalancing the
public finances, or freeing economic incentives through tax liberalization, or ensuring
appropriate tax incentives to attract mobile inward capital investment, have attracted
most attention; so also have ‘lucky’ factors such as the availability of a ready supply
of skilled labour at reasonable costs (Barry 1999; Nolan et al. 2000). Indeed, given
these conditions, some observers have held that there is nothing particularly unusual
in the Irish experience, and that getting the economic fundamentals right was bound to
produce just the sort of ‘catch-up’ growth we have actually seen (Honohan and Walsh
2002).
But the political alignments that make such policy decisions possible can tend to be
overlooked. What governments actually do requires us to think about the issues that
arise at the margins of political and economic analysis, for policy making is rarely a
matter of simply identifying the most technically appropriate solutions and
implementing them. The steps involved include the process of choosing which among
an array of policies to adopt, assessing how this interacts with policy commitments in
other areas, and building enough agreement with those involved in their
implementation to ensure that they will work as intended. Policy making involves
interplay between the political authorities – government, public administration – and
various organized interests, the outcome of which is uncertain. Political scientists
have noted that the institutional framework – the legal structures and established
policy routines – create their own incentives for the way in which actors seek to
advance their interests and the way in which they relate to one another (March and2
Olsen 1984; Hall and Taylor 1996). But the way relationships between state officials
and economic actors take shape may vary across policy sectors, for ‘states are not
unitary or monolithic structure. They are organizational complexes whose “parts”
represent different ages, functions, and orientations’ (Weiss 1998, p.15). We cannot
generalize about what the state can do overall, but about the competences of different
parts of the state’s activities. How the governance mechanisms work in each policy
area is a matter that must be empirically investigated. And whether or not the parts
work effectively together is not guaranteed in advance.
A comparative framework can guide our discussion. In many respects Ireland in the
1990s has been a model of economic liberalism, where market-conforming policies in
the areas such as taxation, labour market, and regulatory policy, have been in
evidence. A consistent industrial policy stance facilitated strong FDI-led growth and
an associated modernization of the rest of the economic structure and upgrading of the
employment structure (O'Connell 2000; O'Connell and Russell 2007; Barry et al.
1999). But in some respects its economic governance arrangements – the ways in
which these policies have been arrived at – have been quite unusual. The activist role
of industrial policy is one such example; so too is the significant role that social
partnership came to play not only in pay determination, but also in the distinctive
position it occupies in relation to labour market policy and social welfare issues. This
makes Ireland’s mode of economic governance particularly interesting, and the
puzzles of how new solutions were found to new adaptive challenges, and what the
costs and benefits have been, merit some attention.
Economic governance is understood here to mean the way in which political officials
(government ministers, the civil service, and the state agencies) engage with3
organized interests (chiefly the trade union and employers’ representative
organizations). We need to understand how the actors relate to one another in a
particular institutional context that shapes the way they interact, and a particular
framework of policy inherited from the past that constrains the options available to
them in their current choices. And finally, it may well be relevant to know something
about the way they saw the world, the values and priorities they held, the political
discourse that captured their outlook Our concern, therefore, is with institutions,
actors, and ideas (or as some have termed it, polity, policy and politics – the
framework of interactions, the dynamics of engagement between actors, and the
undetermined outcome of their mutual engagements that are shaped by the ideas or
discourse that is most meaningful to them (Treib et al. 2005; Blyth 1997; Schmidt
2000; Schmidt 2002).
Institutional clusters and elective affinities
The scope of what is encompassed by economic activity is in principle broad.
Virtually every aspect of public policy has an economic dimension: education policy,
for example, is crucial to shaping the supply of appropriate skills and knowledge in
the labour force; transport and communications infrastructure are vital to economic
efficiency; even cultural policy may be said to have an economic dimension insofar as
cultural outputs may be seen as traded and exported goods.
We can outline three broad policy areas, apart from core macroeconomic policy
making, which are vital for the overall profile of economic performance. The first is
the politics of production, in particular industrial policy. The second is the wage-
setting aspects of industrial relations. The third might be identified as the politics of
distribution: income maintenance and welfare services. Within each of the areas, we4
might find variations in the way policy making is organized, depending on the degree
of political centralization of power over an issue area, and the capacity of organized
interests to coordinate and act collectively in their interactions with government.
Yet none of these is hermetically sealed from the others; and we have seen important
changes in policy-making happening both within each of these and across them,
linking them in new ways. There are constraints on what can be done in one policy
area, as this will have spillover effects on other areas. These have been analysed in
terms of institutional complementarities. In explaining differences in the way
production processes are organized across countries, it has been noted that the
feedback effect from good performance in one policy area makes it more likely that a
complementary policy choice will be made in a related policy area (Soskice 1999).
These reinforcing dynamics help explain why, for example, German capitalism has
been resistant to dismantling its long-term funding relationships between banks and
firms, and why employers remain broadly committed to industry-level pay bargaining
and the distinctive vocational training system (Thelen 2000).
A similar point can be made more generally about links across policy sectors. As
Ebbinghaus notes, policy choices across distinct issues such as industrial policy, pay
bargaining and industrial relations, and welfare state provision, are likely to display
‘elective affinities’ – incentives and constraints mean that measures put in place in
one policy arena will tend to complement those that are important in others
(Ebbinghaus 1998). Actors have interests that span policy sectors. But there is no
guarantee that outcomes will be complementary – some policy choices, perhaps made
under pressure from strong organized interests, may well be highly dysfunctional for
other aspects of economic performance. Neither is there any single recipe for getting5
policy coordination functioning well. Hence the interest in examining how key
economic actors relate to one another not only within but also across policy areas,
which may have different institutional settings.
Ireland offers an interesting and instructive case-study in comparative context. In
principle, Ireland might belong to two ‘families’ of countries in Europe. One of these
is the other ‘small open economies’, with a bias toward consensus-oriented decision-
making. The other is the ‘liberal market economies’, with a bias toward market-led
and market-conforming policy choices.
Ireland can usefully be compared with Europe’s small open economies, sharing many
adaptive pressures in common with, for example, Denmark or Sweden or Switzerland.
Small open economies, it is argued, experience a strong incentive to organize
domestically in response to international economic fluctuations. They ‘complemented
their pursuit of liberalism in the international economy with a strategy of domestic
compensation’ (Katzenstein 1985, p.47). They found ways of inserting themselves
effectively into international trade with a successful industrial policy. Meanwhile,
domestic producers and consumers were likely to find that greater exposure to the
world economy entailed new kinds of economic vulnerability. So states are subject to
electoral demands for new domestic interventions, both to assist indigenous industry
and to support living standards through transfer payments. These pressures are likely
to come most strongly from those at greatest risk of having their livelihood disrupted
by trade in the context of growing economic openness – in the Irish case, particularly
important after 1973 and membership of what was then the European Economic
Community.6
But there is a second perspective on Irish political economy. Much of the comparative
discussion of small open economies tends to focus on the Scandinavian countries, or
the small Alpine states of Switzerland and Austria, or the Low Countries of the
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. These countries share something else in
common with one another, that is, the structure of their business organization and its
linkages to the state. They are highly ‘coordinated market economies’ (Hall and
Soskice 2001), alongside bigger countries such as Germany and France. Coordinated
market economies feature strong, long-term linkages between financial and industrial
capital, which in turn tend to have close links with the top state policy-makers. They
also tend to have highly institutionalised industrial relations systems characterized by
strong, coordinated employer and union organizations.
Rather less attention has been paid to the economic adjustment problems that might
face a small, open economy that falls into the cluster of ‘liberal market economies’.
Liberal market economies are chiefly the English-speaking countries, which shared a
tradition of common law and a commitment to market liberalism. These economies
have typically relied more strongly on financial markets to fund industrial investment,
and never had the strong, long-term linkages between financial and industrial capital
characteristic of the more coordinated economies. Their models of wage bargaining
tended to feature a more fragmented pattern and more market-conforming outcomes
than among coordinated countries. And their welfare provisions tend to be less
generous, more geared toward safety-net provision. Ireland, with its institutional and
policy legacies derived from the British model, falls into this cluster in many respects.7
But industrial policy, industrial relations and its related issues, and welfare state
policy, do not exist in an institutional vacuum: the overall framework is the
authoritative decision-making by government. States have a vital role to play in
mediating the effects of changes in the international economy (Evans 1995; Schmidt
1995). Even if there are many constraints on their options, there is still considerable
latitude in the choices states make in the combination of policies promoting equity
and efficiency (Ganghof 2000; Garrett 2000; Hall 1999; Pontusson 2005). The threat
of capital disinvestment has not foreclosed the possibility of policy choice. Indeed,
evidence shows that investors care less about the volume of spending than about the
size of the debt required to fund it, and are prepared to accommodate to a variety of
party possibilities in government (Mosley 2003; Swank 2002). There is no evidence
of a convergence of states’ adaptive responses around the liberal, market-led model.
There is still considerable variation in the patterns countries display in their policy
choices.
The Irish experience is of particular interest in these debates. Whether we look at
industrial policy, at pay determination and industrial relations, or at welfare state
policies, policy choices no not fit easily into either of the two clusters outlined above.
The institutional and legal structure of Irish business is based on the liberal model:
ownership structures, industrial funding, and market flotation, are very similar to
those seen in Britain and the USA. The industrial relations system is voluntarist in
style, consistent with its inheritance from the British system, and not highly embedded
in legally binding rights and duties as is the case in Continental European systems.
The welfare state developed from its origins in British social protection schemes, and
shares many affinities with it in its core reliance on means-tested and targeted
programmes.8
However, patterns of Irish economic governance have departed from the British
model in some respects. We find that the directions taken often correspond to the kind
of adjustment said to be typical of small open economies. Ireland’s institutional and
policy inheritance, the way different policy sectors were organized administratively,
the structure and preferences of the main economic actors, and the nature of the
linkages between organized interests and government, place it as an interesting variant
on the liberal market type (Hardiman 2002b, 2005).
The issue, then, is how new economic challenges are met in a country which is small
and open, but which has many features of a liberal market economy. Ireland is a
critical case study with which to explore this question. How do actors and institutions
respond to new situations, and with what sorts of consequences for distributive
outcomes and opportunities for the members of that society?
Continuity and change: adjustment under pressure
The broad contours of Ireland’s recent economic history are relatively uncontentious
and are often seen in three phases. From the late 1950s until the early1970s, the move
away from protectionism saw the first sustained growth spell for several decades. This
took place against the backdrop of conservative fiscal policy and a monetary policy
that was constrained by the maintenance until 1979 of parity with sterling of the Irish
pound (Kennedy et al. 1988). A second phase of recurrent crises and crisis
management begins with the international oil crisis in 1973, which coincided with
Ireland’s accession to EEC membership. Increased exposure to the international
economy proved devastating for many indigenous firms, but also saw a heightened
inflow of foreign investment. Fiscal mistakes in the late 1970s intensified the effects
of the subsequent international downturn – a more active fiscal policy had resulted in9
strong pro-cyclical impulses that proved difficult to curb (Honohan 1999). Attempts at
fiscal stabilization during the 1980s were bedevilled by internal coalition tensions and
constrained by recessionary conditions; high unemployment, steady emigration, and
persistently high public debt created a sense of mounting crisis.
The late 1980s mark the start of a third phase. The eventual establishment of a party
political consensus over macroeconomic priorities made it possible to curb spending
and achieve fiscal stabilization. ‘Jobless growth’ seemed to be the country’s fate for
several years more. The latter half of the 1990s, though, were years of economic
boom, with very rapid growth translating for the first time into virtually full
employment, despite a rapid expansion of the labour force. Economic performance in
the 2000s proved bumpier following the end of the US-led boom. By this time, the
tools of macroeconomic management had become more tightly constrained:
membership of the Euro currency zone reduced whatever scope had previously
existed for selective exchange rate changes, or interest rate adjustments, to manage
domestic performance. The burden of adjustment was thrown more forcefully onto
fiscal policy on the one hand, and domestic cost management on the other. Ireland had
by this point attained the unexpected status of being among the wealthiest of the
OECD member countries (FitzGerald 2000; Nolan and Maitre 2007). It had yet to
deal with serious recession in the new policy environment.
These are the broad outlines of the story. Within these broad parameters we see
parallel adjustments taking place in discrete policy sectors. But the scope and reach of
the state proved to be different in each. The manner in which policy change occurred10
was subject to rather different imperatives in industrial policy, pay policy and
industrial relations, and welfare state development. In each of these cases we can see
that growing economic openness and social vulnerability created pressures for policy
adjustments. But not only do we see changes in policy content within established
routines of doing things, we also see some changes taking place in governance
mechanisms themselves. What shifts in policy clusters underlay these developments?
Industrial development
The move from protectionism toward free trade involved adoption of an increasingly
active industrial policy. In the 1950s, about half Ireland’s workforce was engaged in
relatively low-yielding agricultural activities. By the 2000s agriculture employed
fewer than 8% of the workforce, internationally traded services were booming, and
foreign-owned firms accounted for about three-quarters of the value of all exports.
There is an element of luck in this: a low corporation tax regime and a consistent
policy stance on foreign direct investment were in place for several decades before
they yielded the transformative changes of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the modern
Industrial Development Authority (IDA) has been identified as the key activist
institution in making these industrial policy priorities effective, with a great deal of
operational autonomy from the civil service proper. Ó Riain has gone so far as to
identify Ireland’s activist industrial policy mix with the ‘developmental’ states of East
Asia – though in this case, prioritising market incentives and working through looser
networks rather than depending on dirigiste or protectionist state agencies (Ó Riain
2004).11
There was nothing obvious about this though. The first steps toward raising the
growth potential of the Irish economy, as protective tariffs were dismantled, were
intended to be taken by increasing agricultural production and exports. The IDA, first
established in 1949, initially functioned very much on the margins of domestic
industrial activity. State sponsorship of industrial development continued to
predominate in official thinking, principally due to the leading position occupied by
Seán Lemass, who held key ministerial roles overseeing industrial development in the
1930s and 1940s, as well as the role of Taoiseach in the early 1960s (Daly 1992).
Protected domestic industry was recognized to be vulnerable; the turn toward free
trade was accompanied by a range of initiatives to assist indigenous industry. In
classic ‘small open economy’ mode, new bodies were set up to help firms, most of
which were quite small-scale, to become more cost-effective, to acquire marketing
skills, to engage more actively in exporting – principally, at this time, to the British
market. And new consultative and advisory bodies were established to engage
employers and unions in improved exchanges of information, the better to foster a
climate of effective industrial adaptation. Some tax incentives already existed to
encourage manufacturing exports. In time, these became the central element of the
policy of attracting new inward investment, but they were not initially conceived for
this purpose.
However, neither state commercial bodies nor the existing industrial sector proved
equal to the task of driving the expansion of indigenous industry. The parallel
initiatives to encourage the domestic private sector producers to rationalize and
become more export-oriented proved rather disappointing – inputs of information or
marketing skills alone did not prove sufficient to upgrade domestic production and
innovation systems (Mjoset 1992). It was this recognition that occasioned the major12
reorganization of the IDA in 1969, through which it acquired much greater
operational autonomy and began to focus more deliberately on seeking foreign
sources of industrial investment capital. This gave industrial policy a head-start in
taking advantage of EEC membership from 1973. The consequences were double-
edged: much of indigenous industry was still poorly adapted to compete effectively.
The newly developing modern, competitive, export-oriented sector was almost
entirely made up of foreign-owned, especially US firms that were keen to gain a
foothold in European markets, attracted by tax incentives and a relatively low cost
base, and interested in working in an English-language environment.
Ó Riain notes that major reviews of the functioning of the IDA, resulting in changes
to its structure and functioning, were precipitated by the need to find convincing
domestic policy responses to shifts in the international economic environment (Ó
Riain 2004, pp. 178-187). By the early 1980s, the problems of indigenous industry
were very much to the fore. The 1982 Telesis report, commissioned by the tripartite
NESC, indirectly led to the structural differentiation of the IDA into agencies with
separate responsibilities for foreign and domestic sectors. The 1992 report of the
Culliton Review Body, emerging from social partnership processes, opened up a
much wider agenda of policy changes needed to support industrial development.
Effective use of the EU Structural Funds required reorganization of state supports for
domestic industry. It was also recognized that increasing the inflow and
embeddedness of foreign investment would require attention to energy pricing,
infrastructural investment, and other related policies. The Culliton Report produced
another round of organizational change including the creation of separate new
agencies to support the needs of domestic industry and to attract new foreign
investment, plus the further rationalization and reorganization of bodies concerned13
with labour market policies, training needs, and especially with the promotion of
science and technology policy.
The process of state withdrawal from support for inefficient enterprises continued in
parallel with these changes, driven in part by EU limits to state subsidies and
requirements to liberalize competition. However, industrial policy did not rely solely
on increasing economic incentives through liberating market processes; rather, it was
actively managed by state agencies. The IDA built up extensive networking
capabilities which not only responded to but strategically targeted potential investors
in key growth sectors (MacSharry and White 2000, pp. 198-308). It was important in
the upgrading of the third-level education sector, particularly the investments made in
the 1980s and 1990s in science and technology training (White 2001). Its role in
mediating the relationship between the international realm and the domestic economy
has been seen as a classic form of ‘developmental network state’. As Ó Riain and
others have noted, the IDA was remarkably free of political scandal. Some of the
strongest sectors of domestic activity tended to have close personal financial links
with political parties which could at times shade into clientelism and even corruption.
These often included non-traded activities such as planning and construction, and the
domestic banking sector, but extended into exporting sectors such as meat processing
(Ó Riain 2004, pp. 178-80). Industrial policy relating to the foreign-owned sector, in
contrast, was not subject to scandals of this sort.
While the industrial agencies overseeing state agencies have a lot of autonomy, they
function within the context of government policy and are ultimately responsible to the
relevant Minister. Nevertheless, we can see that the membership of boards of the
various agencies is heavily drawn from the business sector and hardly at all from the14
trade unions or the voluntary sector (Ó Riain 2004, pp.151-2). This gives the IDA a
particularly close relationship with transnational companies – to the extent even of
organizing them to exert influence over government decision-making (ibid., p.155).
Pay and work
Wage-setting and industrial relations in Ireland have been governed by a much more
direct interplay of government intervention and market allocation mechanisms than
we have seen in the case in industrial policy. The fragmented trade union movement,
the low level of industrial development, the small scale of indigenous industry during
the1960s would suggest that market mechanisms would prevail in wage-setting.
However, against this one might posit two other sorts of pressures. The first is the
logic of coordination facing the small open economy, which is a price-taker on world
markets, and in which unemployment functions as a discipline on failure to achieve
cost-based adjustments, at any rate in the absence of exchange rate flexibility. This
would suggest that there might be an incentive, particularly for trade unions, to
attempt some restructuring or at least coordination of bargaining activity (Olson 1971;
Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Crouch 2000). The second is the institutional and policy
inheritance of protectionism itself. This gave government – especially, as we have
seen, Seán Lemass in his various ministerial and prime ministerial roles – a strong
role in trying to shape domestic actors’ responses to the development initiatives. The
long dominance of Fianna Fáil in power gave it some advantage here. So too did its
more general successes in creating and recreating durable cross-class coalitions of
support throughout changes in policy orientation, grounded in a broad nationalist
ideology (Bew et al. 1989).15
Both factors played some role in shifts in the politics of pay determination, but their
relative weight shifted over time: our explanation of social partnership since 1987
needs to be given its proper context. Under protectionism, government had sought
several times to bring about a rationalization of trade union structures. The 1941
Trade Union Act had tried to reduce the number of unions recognized for pay
bargaining purposes. This would also have given an advantage to Irish-based unions
over those with head offices in Britain; indeed, the trade union movement split largely
along these lines from the mid-1940s until 1959. The attempt to hasten organizational
change failed due to constitutional protections for the right to organize. In its wake,
the Industrial Relations Act 1946 set up a new set of institutions around a voluntarist
Labour Court with joint union and employer participation. The original intention was
that this would not only facilitate dispute resolution but also that it would play a
strong role in setting the terms of pay bargaining. Although unions were fragmented
and decentralized, wage leadership by key groups, especially craft workers, set the
norm for successive informally legitimated wage rounds through the 1950s and 1960s
at approximately two-year intervals. The Labour Court played some role in setting
the terms for some of these, particularly the 1964 wage round. But by the late 1960s,
the limits of informal arrangements were very clear. A wave of strikes, secondary
actions, and what appeared to be the total collapse of wage norms, created conditions
of crisis.
The changes that took place in pay bargaining were driven in part by the trade union
leadership itself, as key union leaders within the Irish Congress of Trade Unions
sought to strengthen procedural norms governing disputes and picketing. And leaders
of the largest unions were also behind the move toward regularizing wage rounds in a
series of formal National Wage Agreements, which persisted throughout the 1970s.16
These were also Irish-based unions that were more sympathetic to working with
government and were less strongly wedded to traditions of workplace militancy
favoured by British-based unions. But there was a large element of sanction involved
too – the ‘shadow of the state’, as Sharpf has termed it, which need not be actively
implemented to achieve the desired effect (Scharpf 2000). New legislation governing
industrial relations was introduced in 1969, and the first pay agreement in 1970 was
concluded in the context of government proposals to introduce a statutory pay deal for
the public service.
This series of pay agreements depended on voluntary compliance and recourse to the
monitoring institutions, which included a new set of employer-labour organizations as
well as a new role for the statutory labour relations machinery. But within the new
framework, the powerful impetus toward local fragmented bargaining persisted. In the
context of mounting fiscal crisis in the early 1980s, the employers finally put an end
to the process.
In these circumstances, one of the possibilities for government might be to conclude
that pay coordination had failed, and that market-driven adjustment was the logical
alternative. In a system featuring strong union organization but little centralization or
coordination, the options for improving aggregate outcomes might be to drive the
level of bargaining down to workplace level, to oblige bargaining outcomes to
respond directly to firm-level conditions. This was, in effect, the strategy adopted by
the British Conservative government at this time. The coalition government of Fine
Gael and Labour refused to attempt a centralized pay deal, seeing little or no scope in
the context of mounting fiscal crisis. But there was no constituency for trying
deliberately to weak the unions either. Yet while trade union membership suffered17
badly with rising unemployment, the impetus of wage-rounds continued to be felt,
driven in part at this stage by the deals the government continued to make within the
public sector.
The negotiation of a new pay agreement in 1987 marks the start of the new phase of
tripartism, of a growing network of social partnership arrangements through which a
succession of pay deals was concluded. The agreements were far more extensive in
scope than their predecessors in the 1970s; the linkages between pay, tax cuts, and
other policy commitments was more overt. Why did this come about, and what is its
significance for economic governance?
A major review of trade union strategic orientation must certainly be a big part of the
explanation. During the 1970s, pay bargaining had moved away from pure market-
driven trends and had achieved some degree of coordination, but this remained
subject to the fissiparous tendencies of a diverse union movement. Moreover, they
organized and negotiated in very diverse circumstances, with the emergence of a
‘two-tier’ economic structure that increasingly contrasted a modern, high-tech sector
with traditional, labour-intensive, indigenous industry. Wage leadership in the 1970s
was concentrated in the former sector, which contributed further to the problems of
adjustment to new competitiveness conditions. During the 1980s, key union leaders
recognized that a decisive shift was required if unions were not to go the way of their
British counterparts at this time. The tripartite context of the National Economic and
Social Council (NESC) facilitated the move to link pay trends, inflation,
unemployment, and debt stabilization in an agreed policy framework. Employers,
initially sceptical, grew warmer toward the pay agreements as their effectiveness was
proved in practice. The network of consultation involved by social partnership18
broadened to include community and voluntary sector interests as well as union,
employer, farmer and other business interests.
Social partnership, though, owes its origins to a political initiative on the part of the
incoming Fianna Fáil government in 1987. Committed to a strong fiscal stabilization
package that included radical cuts in social spending, it offered a tax-cutting
counterpart to boost take-home employee pay. While this may seem paradoxical, the
restructuring of the tax system was long overdue, and employee income had long
borne a disproportionate burden. Social partnership was thus conceived as part of a
crisis-management strategy. But during the 1990s, it proved sufficiently flexible to
secure agreements in the face of changing economic conditions, weathering even the
stresses caused by very rapid growth in the years coming up to 2000.
While economists’ opinions vary, many hold that social partnership played an
important role in economic stabilization and in managing the potentially inflationary
or conflictual aspects of growth during the 1990s and into the 2000s. Former Minister
for Finance Ray MacSharry and Pádraic White, former chief executive of the
Industrial Development Authority, argued that ‘the twin pillars of economic success
since the mid-1980s were fiscal stability and social partnership’ (MacSharry and
White 2000. p.369). Others have commented that the tax reform strategy undertaken
since the late 1980s, to broaden the tax base and reduce employee tax liabilities, could
not have been undertaken without the implied restraint on inflationary pressures
provided by the partnership agreements (Hardiman 2002a). Growth thus translated
more readily into employment creation in the latter half of the 1990s. Along with the19
Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, Ireland’s performance far outstripped that of the
more deregulated labour markets of the UK, New Zealand, and Australia (Schwartz
1994, 2000b, 2000a; Auer 2000). The OECD commented on Ireland’s ‘peerless
performance’ that made it ‘a world leader in a number of aspects of economic
performance’ (OECD 1999).
The negotiated governance of pay continued to be managed through voluntarist
agreements. The network of institutional supports was now stronger and more firmly
embedded than previously. Moreover, the complex network of working groups and
special initiatives that grew out of partnership processes meant that an ever-broader
range of issues came under the ambit of partnership. Labour market issues had long
been central. These were defined increasingly widely to include aspects of child care
provision, education and housing issues, and many others.
In effect, social partnership grew beyond labour market issues to become a new form
of network governance, offering privileged access not only to the organized economic
interests but also to broader voluntary sector organizations. Rhodes argued about
British network governance that wrote that ‘Networks are not accountable to the state:
they are self-organizing’ (Rhodes 2000, p.61). But the negotiating and policy
networks connected to social partnership were rather different. Social partnership in
Ireland depends on political sponsorship; the Department of the Taoiseach is the
institutional locus for coordinating initiatives to renew it, at approximately three-year
intervals. There is little indication that scope would exist for the kind of autonomous
bipartite employer-labour agreements evident elsewhere, at national level in the
Netherlands, or industry agreements in Sweden or indeed Germany (Traxler 2000).
The key actors in supporting Irish social partnership are indigenous manufacturing20
and the public sector. Union organization is low, and often unrecognised, in the large
and growing foreign high-tech manufacturing sector, and in the high-value traded
services sector that has grown up around the tax and other incentives provided to the
Irish Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in Dublin. These sectors broadly followed the
centrally negotiated pay norms, but retained the right to adjust their own wage rates
more flexibly, especially through the use of bonuses and fringe benefits.
The Irish economy therefore had many of the features of market-related flexible cost
adjustment, combined with coordinated management of costs in the most politically
sensitive sectors such as the public service. But this in effect increases the lobbying
power of insider interests – and in any system where public service workers bulk large
in wage agreements, their interests may well diverge from those of the cost-sensitive
traded sectors (Garrett and Way 1999) Indeed, by the mid-2000s, concerns were
widely expressed at the loss of competitiveness, rising cost base, and inflation levels
above the EU average (OECD 2007).
Social partnership may be seen as a new mode of economic governance, but one
which remained bounded by discretionary government decision-making. Social
partnership was valued mainly by its contribution to improved economic
performance, or ‘output legitimacy’. Nevertheless, it also became a core part of the
broader consultative apparatus of policy making. The processes fell outside the
framework of representative government, and the degree to which they could speak
for the whole of their constituency remained contested. After all, the unions heavily
over-represented public sector employment, and had a much slighter presence in the
high-tech sector in which trade union organization was not permitted. Nevertheless,
the right to have a voice had become more broadly accepted. Social partnership had21
acquired a much stronger ‘input legitimacy’ than before. Government accepted this on
the grounds, as a senior civil servant close to the partnership process noted,
Social partnership is about the alignment of agendas. It is not about
bargaining, but about figuring what policy choices are available. If anything, it
is a privileged relationship with government for the social partners. The wider
policy agenda is driven by what government wants to achieve, tempered by an
understanding of what is feasible; it thus provides an important opportunity for
a wide range of interests to influence government thinking. (Hardiman 2006).
Social partnership has created a nexus of consultative and participatory relationships
with government which embed organized interests in the political process more firmly
than the model of liberal market economies might suggest, and more centrally than is
apparent in Britain, for example. The significance of these policy channels waxes and
wanes. Where policy alternatives are clear – on taxation, for example – government
discretion ultimately prevails. But social partnership has come to structure the public
space more extensively than could have been anticipated when attempts at formal pay
agreements first started in 1970.
Welfare provisions
Welfare state provision developed rapidly in Ireland from the early 1970s on, starting
from a relatively low base in comparative European terms. While much of the growth
in spending at this time was driven by cyclical factors – especially the rise in
unemployment – broadened entitlements and new programme entitlements also
played an important part. The structure of the welfare state is complex, due to its dual
inheritance from British social legislation in the early 20
th century, and the important
role of church organizations in providing services which came increasingly to be
funded by the state, though without altering structures of ownership and management,
especially in health care and education. And while a significant Catholic social22
services sector would not be uncommon in continental Europe, its scale in Ireland,
and the funding arrangements which make it both the public as well as the religious
option, makes it quite distinctive if not indeed unique.
The result is that the Irish welfare state proves difficult to classify in comparative
terms. In shares with the liberal or Anglo-American model of welfare state a reliance
on minimal provision and means-testing, and a relative low level of service provision
(Esping-Andersen 1990). But some indicators point in other directions, such as the
floor-raising uprating of means-tested benefits in response to long-term
unemployment in the early 1990s, or the strong familial emphasis in the structure of
tax liabilities and welfare payments (Cousins 1997).
Identifying the incidence of poverty is contentious and depends heavily on definitions
and measurements, though material wellbeing has varied greatly with phases in
economic performance. If the most restrictive and least contentious definitions of
poverty concern ‘acute deprivation’, that is, material or lifestyle deprivations
combined with income poverty, then the trend shows a distinct improvement and fell
from almost 15 per cent in 1994 to under 5 per cent in 2001 (Nolan et al. 2002;
Whelan et al. 2007). And while relative income inequality had certainly increased
during the growth years, this was due in large measure to market factors to do with
the changing profile of the labour force and the composition of employment, rather
than changes in the profile of welfare provision itself (Nolan and Maitre 2007).
Income supports and welfare issues have become more central to social partnership
policy discussions. But priority-setting and decision-making remain firmly under
government control. Yet at the same time, and despite considerable growth in public23
spending, government’s direct control over the modes of service delivery continued to
be more attenuated in Ireland than in many other systems. Problems of capacity and
responsiveness therefore led to a growth in reliance on privately funded services.
The Irish trade union movement was able to achieve greater coordination in interest
representation in the face of economic crisis, and to forge a new consensus around the
negotiation of national-level framework pay agreements. But this did not necessarily
extend to a strong commitment to the ‘social wage’ whereby improvements in social
services or welfare provision would be seen as directly offsetting pay claims. Rather,
the pay-tax agenda was pursued as the core part of each pay agreement throughout the
period of social partnership. The networks of social partnership working groups
allowed union movement and the voluntary sector organizations voice on a range of
welfare issues. But these transferred only intermittently into the core policy processes
of public administration, and the issues taken up were dictated more by government
electoral priorities than by the social partnership process itself.
The party political system is not usually thought to reflect class differences well, yet
both the major parties and any potential coalition groupings have an incentive to
maximize their support among the broadest support base possible. This has been seen
as leading to a ‘politics of the median voter’, rather than facilitating strong support for
an egalitarian or redistributive or universalist set of preferences (Hardiman 1998). The
linkages between government and service delivery tend to favour the segmentation of
interests through the intermeshing of public and private provisions. The presence of
organized interests in the network of social partnership arrangements means that there
is a strong political and institutional resistance to the possibility of welfare state
retrenchment. But interest fragmentation means that there is little opposition to the24
complex mix of public and private welfare services, notwithstanding problems of
equitable access.
While the interplay of public and private is far from unusual in welfare state
organization, it is more extensive in Ireland than in many countries. Not only do
religious organizations have a significant role in delivering publicly funded services,
especially in healthcare and education, but cross-subsidies between public and private
are often opaque and underestimated (Nolan and Wiley 2000). This means that private
funding (or private insurance) allows enhanced provision or faster access, in what has
been termed a ‘pay-related welfare state’ (O Riain and O'Connell 2000): those who
can afford to pay can benefit from enhanced services that are, in effect, subsidized by
the public system.
Funding arrangements in many areas continue to be fragmented as a direct result of
the institutional interpenetration of public and private provision. For example,
successive governments in the 20
th century accepted that religious organizations were
the proper managers and controllers of the greater part of the education system
(Garvin 2004; O'Connor 1986) The biggest change in the funding relationships in
education came in the late 1960s, with the introduction of free second-level education
and improved transport facilities. But this did not introduce a ‘state’ sector in Irish
education. And the merger between former vocation or technical schools with
religiously-run secondary schools, in the community and comprehensive sector,
which became more common from the 1970s on, did not result in a new public
education sector, but rather introduced a new type of hybrid management system
between public and private interests (O Buachalla 1988). The sharp decline in
religious staff, the drop in church attendances during the 1990s, and the growing25
diversity of the Irish population put growing pressure on the system of strong reliance
on denominational ownership and control of educational facilities. Some changes in
the structure of Boards of Management during the 1990s increased public
participation and accountability, but the governance of education continue to be
structured along the historically established and largely denominationally owned and
managed lines. Among the legacies of this was a ‘private’ fee-paying sector in which
fees functioned as a top-up on public funding; but also a pattern of per capita public
spending per pupil, at both primary and secondary levels, considerably below OECD
averages.
The governance of health care involved a similarly complex mix of provision through
public funding, some publicly owned hospitals, and networks of private service
providers. The 19
th century two-tier dispensary system remained in place much longer
in Ireland than in Britain and was only finally abolished in 1970. The income
thresholds for full free medical entitlements (through medical card entitlement)
remained very low; despite some limited universal entitlements for some categories.
Self-employed professionals in health care continued to have a prominent place in the
overall pattern of provision that was not fundamentally challenged by the expansion
of entitlements. The pivotal role of hospital consultants, brought into question from
time to time, was never fundamentally challenged. Their continued prominence in the
system gave them an important veto player role in any future planning of acute
services (Barrington 2003; Immergut 1992). Primary care expansion came about
through contracting with self-employed GPs through per-capita payments to treat
medical card holders, resulting in a fragmentation of primary care.26
The strong inheritance of the intermingling of public and private, as noted above,
creates a bias or barrier against consideration of universal provision or prioritising
egalitarian priorities in welfare provision. As a senior civil servant commented,
In Ireland, the middle classes are expected to look after themselves. For a long
time they were excluded from Social Insurance schemes; they are encouraged
to take out private health insurance, pensions and so on. (Hardiman 2006).
And yet the extent to which public funding subsidizes private provision is often
overlooked. The increase in public spending and the expansion of entitlements
overlaid many of the institutional patterns laid down in an earlier age.
Conclusion
The coordination of policy commitments across the principal domains of economic
management was does not necessarily produce functional outcomes. Each of the
policy domains relating to overall economic performance is subject to a different
structure of institutionalized policy making and implementation.
In a broader context, though, policy adaptation across different domains in Ireland can
be understood as a response to two different imperatives, not necessarily
complementary to one another, but where the scope for adaptation is strongly
institutionally bounded. On the one hand, Ireland’s growth strategy from the late
1950s on was based on facilitating inward investment through a low corporation tax
regime, and the maintenance of relatively low levels of labour force regulation. This
strengthened a variant of liberal market economy institutions and practices. New
industrial investment was energetically courted by an activist state agency, and as a
host FDI country, complementary public investments were made, especially in the
expansion of third-level education. But the profile of educational training and the27
supply of labour were weakly coordinated with industry or employer preferences,
relying rather on market signals to induce appropriate responses.
On the other hand, industrial relations policy circled repeatedly round attempts to
achieve better coordination among bargaining groups, the better to improve aggregate
performance in growth, inflation, strikes, and job creation. These initiatives were
more akin to the adjustment strategies of other small open economies with strong
interest representation than to the politics of liberal economies relying on market
disciplines to bring union demands into line. Social partnership institutions set up a
panoply of extra-parliamentary influences that came to be an effective vehicle for
putting a very wide range of concerns onto the political agenda. Government may or
may not take these up, and insisted on its democratic mandate to put electoral
accountability above interest group demands. But the privileged access afforded to
the broad array of organized interests provided a strong and flexible mode of raising
and keeping issues on the political agenda. And for trade union members, the trade-
off in social partnership processes was more strongly based on the individualistic
logic of tax cuts than on a solidaristic commitment to improving the social wage.
But the different logics at work in governing the economy need not lead to optimal or
even complementary outcomes. Wage-setting policy has been based strongly on the
public sector and the better-organized manufacturing sector; foreign-owned high-tech
firms followed suit during the 1990s once their own circumstances warranted it; and
most of the sizeable private services sector, increasing sections of which are now
internationally traded, is not covered by pay deals at all. But the strong political
commitment to wage coordination may be vulnerable to the preferences of labour
market insiders and especially to the pressure that can be exerted by public sector28
employees. Public sector pay is not clearly benchmarked against market-based
comparators. Not only does this drive up the cost of providing public services, it risks
pushing up the cost base of production and a deterioration in competitiveness, both of
which would be inimical to overall growth priorities.
But while a political commitment to social partnership is somewhat at odds with the
underlying structural features of a liberal market economy, the scope of pay
coordination deals is constrained by precisely these deep institutional features of the
economy. Employers have resisted both broadening and deepening the reach of
partnership processes. They have accepted the introduction of a minimum wage, for
example, and have supported institutionalized processes over union recognition. But
they have opposed union proposals to strengthen union recognition rights, for
example, or a stronger workplace presence in works councils. And despite the range
of topics under discussion in partnership structures, unions have found it impossible
to make welfare state or income maintenance issues central to the pay deals
themselves.
The kind of response a country will adopt to changes in the international economic
context will be shaped by the interplay of domestic institutions and the organized
interests working through them. Institutional innovation will be disciplined and
constrained by market pressures. Contrary to the common wisdom that ‘you can’t
buck the markets’, it is entirely possible to do so, up to a piont; but whether it is done
wisely or not can take some time to find out.29
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